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Abstract 
This paper aims at disentangling Saudi Arabia’s crude oil strategy, taking into account 
critical factors such as oil stock, crude oil price, world demand conditions and macro-
economic factors. Our study estimates three Error Correction Models (ECMs), using 
data spanning the period 1971-2015. The empirical findings provide sufficient evidence 
on the way Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production strategy affects crude oil market. 
Specifically, when world crude oil demand increases, Saudi Arabia engages into 
exploitative practices since it tries to impose higher prices leaving room for the 
increased demand to the rest of the OPEC countries (market sharing). Moreover, we 
argue that Saudi Arabia’s strategy is in alliance with the trade-off theory of producing 
more crude oil to establish its market share. However, the country does not intent to 
fully cover all the increased demand and does not over-react to short-run demand 
fluctuations since such a strategy would push crude oil prices down. 
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Introduction 
Saudi Arabia holds nearly 18 per cent of the world’s petroleum reserves and ranks 
as the largest exporter of petroleum (OPEC, 2016a). The oil and gas sector accounts for 
about 50 per cent of its gross domestic product, and about 85 per cent of its export 
earnings. Following almost a decade of high crude oil prices, the main two Sovereignty 
Wealth Funds of Saudi Arabia, namely the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency Foreign 
Holdings and the Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund, have increased sharply their 
revenues, leading to total reserves (including gold) of 734 billion US dollars in year 
2013, according to the Sovereignty Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI, 2016). Considering 
that the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s reserves has been increased over the last decade, 
with high oil prices, it derives that crude oil price strongly affects Saudi Arabia’s 
earnings.  
Therefore, Saudi Arabia has a strong interest to keep crude oil prices at high levels, 
even if this requires to decrease its own production. This is exactly the production 
model attributed to OPEC, where the participating oil exporting countries agree on their 
production rates and Saudi Arabia, as the largest producer, is acting as the swing 
producer, namely readjusts its production compared to the fluctuations of the 
production from other countries and the evolution of global crude oil demand. 
However, OPEC member countries are deviating from their commitments, concerning 
their productions rates, due to internal problems of production or aiming at supporting 
their balances. This practically affects the production share of Saudi Arabia and 
therefore its profitability. This leads Saudi Arabia to doubts concerning its role as swing 
producer. Moreover, external -to OPEC- factors, such as the evolution of shale oil and 
gas in the USA, strongly affect the market share of all OPEC countries, challenging 
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their profitability. This has led the OPEC countries, during the 170th (Extraordinary) 
Meeting of the OPEC Conference, to decide: “Based on the above observations and 
analysis, OPEC Member Countries have decided to conduct a serious and constructive 
dialogue with non-member producing countries, with the objective to stabilize the oil 
market and avoid the adverse impacts in the short- and medium-term.” (OPEC, 2016b) 
Therefore, it is of high interest to examine Saudi Arabia’s crude oil strategy, 
especially concerning the adjustment of its crude oil production related to crude oil 
price and world crude oil demand evolution. This paper aims at providing evidence on 
those questions, by providing econometric analysis of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil strategy, 
as related to critical factors such as crude oil stocks, price, world demand, macro-
economic factors, but as well other producers’ production strategy. Towards this target, 
it develops three econometric models, one for Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production, one 
for crude oil prices and one for world crude oil demand.  
The following paper is organized as following: Section 2 provides a literature 
review, while section 3 provides the methodology and the data used. Section 4 provides 
the empirical results and section 5 derives the conclusions of the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
The main research question behind Saudi Arabia’s behavior is whether it behaves 
within the price-market share dilemma. Most researchers describe this trade-off 
between higher price and market share as if Saudi Arabia is a rational monopolist, 
attempting to maximize revenues (Fattouh et. Al. 2016). Since oil was perceived as a 
commodity in scarcity, a rational monopolist would put the hand on the pump, allowing 
low volumes to reach the market, at higher prices. This would maximize its earnings 
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considering the low elasticity of demand. It is this price course that Mabro (1991) 
highlights, and argues that producers cannot obtain the optimum, but they can only have 
increased revenues compared to what they would earn in competitive markets. This 
conclusion is in contradiction to what Pindyck (1978) argued, as under his theory, 
monopolists were gaining enough to cover cartelization costs. Santis (2003) suggests 
that exports quotas and the dominant firm role for Saudi Arabia explain price and output 
changes. Going a step forward explains that extended price fluctuations in the short-run 
are attributed to Saudi Arabia’s inelastic production curve and that a negative demand 
shock will influence deeply Saudi Arabia, which has an incentive to cut production. On 
the contrary when a significant positive demand shock is present, Saudi Arabia does 
not have the incentive to augment production. 
Since oil is not produced by a single country, its revenues are realized by different 
economies and most significantly, the reserves are different. Countries were divided by 
two criteria to examine divisions among producers. These were endowment and 
earnings time preference. Under this theory, countries are divided between price 
pushers, hard core, and expansionist fringe. Since Saudi Arabia has a lot of advantages 
as the largest reserves, ample spare capacity, and low-interest rates, it will prefer lower 
prices, than what other countries would, the rest of the producers attempt to maximize 
wealth earlier (Eckbo 1976). Kaufmann et al. (2004) suggests that capacity utilization, 
production quotas, over the quotas real production and OECD crude stocks do account 
for the price oil fluctuations. Kaufmann et al. (2008) add that OPEC behaviour should 
not be restrained into a single model, as this would ignore real world complexities, and 
the reason behind this is differences among producing countries (geological 
endowment, socio-political and economic systems etc.).  
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But under the theory of industrial organisation a producer has again to choose 
between price and volume. This dilemma is in direct relation to the respective 
compensation a producer has, when he sacrifices either price or volume earnings. If this 
is not the case, and a market share increase does not offset lower prices, then volume 
decline is the best countermeasure. Oil production is not immediately adjustable neither 
oil demand. As a result, both of their elasticities are inelastic in short run. If a producer 
tries to oversupply in a low or declining price environment, there will be no 
compensation resulting in revenue decline (Mabro 1998). Alkhathlan et al. (2014) 
present evidence that the previous is not monolithic. They divided the production period 
into “Normal” ones and those of interruptions. They suggest that Saudi Arabia has a 
binary policy, during the “Normal” periods, they cooperate with the rest of the OPEC 
members, but intervene when there are disruptions. Saudi Arabia’s ultimate goal is to 
sustain OPEC’s production volumes. The incentive to boost oil prices for Saudi Arabia 
do not only stem from the welfare necessity, but also by the local capital markets. 
Mohanty et al. (2011) find significant and positive correlation between price and stock 
market returns for Saudi capital market. 
But the question remains. Who should cut the output and to what extent? Many 
believe that Saudi Arabia should be the first to cut production. On the contrary, Saudi 
Arabia has denounced the role of the swing producer and urges for collective 
agreements. In order to highlight this urgency, the kingdom requires the cooperation of 
non-OPEC countries. But, there is no agreement over volumes even within OPEC. 
Members tried numerous times to allocate volumes based on producers’ characteristics, 
but failed due to objections. In addition, even if countries agree over volumes, there is 
no monitoring and predesigned punishment for the violator. Even if members of OPEC 
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realize that someone is cheating, this will be with a lag and not instantly. The inability 
to monitor and punish the cheaters instantly was proved by Kohl (2002) and Libecap 
and Smith (2004). 
Geroski et al. (1987) proved that there is no perfect collusion, and as a matter of 
fact it is hard for optimum practices to be followed, especially since competitors’ 
responses are also a decision driver. Their finding was later strengthened by Almoguera 
et al. (2011) who find that producers waver between collusion and non-cooperation. 
MacAvoy (1982) had reached different conclusions as he claimed that oil price can be 
best explained by market and economy fundamentals and not by cartel models. All the 
aforementioned, gave rise to the question over how Saudi Arabia reacts.  Griffin (1985) 
used four different models (competitive, cartel, target revenue, property rights) for 
eleven OPEC members.  Target revenue behaviour by OPEC was also proposed by 
Teece (1982). Griffin and Nielson (1994) prove that Saudi Arabia is eager to accept 
profits, if they are higher than Cournot level profits. But if cheating among members 
becomes prevalent, it will rise production to bring profits back to Cournot levels to 
punish cheaters. 
Moreover, it is Saudi Arabia’s interest to avoid price wars. This is supported, by 
previous research, using game theory approaches. Stigler (1964) marks price wars as 
the prelude of collusion. Porter repeatedly recognized price wars as the result of a non-
cooperation game - (Porter 1983 a, b), (Green and Porter 1984). When prices are high, 
each producer uses all of his capacity. No one is willing to cut production as this would 
raise the prices for the rest, and would put demand under threat. If prices fall, then one 
should balance the trade-off, between short-run revenues and others’ reaction, to 
increase his market share. Since collusion is not easy for every period, Haltwinger and 
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Harrington (1991) find that a producer is more eager not to abide by output collusion, 
when demand is falling. This is already known to the Saudi Administration, and this is 
the reason why ample capacity is kept. If a producer tries to increase output, Saudi 
Arabia increases its output  to eliminate any temporary gains confirming its role as a 
discipline enforcer. 
Moreover, Hamilton (1983) and Hamilton (2003) proved that oil price shocks do 
have a significant negative effect on economy. In his second article Hamilton (2003) 
suggests that price spikes have much more negative effects, when positive price shocks 
do not have the same importance. Hamilton (2005) suggests that as we add more data 
then oil price increases influence less GDP growth. Mory (1993) estimates an elasticity 
of -0.0551 of GNP against oil price. Hooker (1996) rejects that oil price has the same 
power it had in the past, as a structural break from 1975 and onwards shows that GDP 
or unemployment were not by-products of oil prices. Bernanke et al. (1997) also suggest 
that energy costs are only a small fraction of the total production costs of the whole 
economy. As a consequence, it was the monetary policy followed in periods of high oil 
prices that harmed the output. Gault (2011) highlights that a $10/barrel increase (when 
the price was $100/barrel) would increase price index and decrease disposable income. 
Gault then continues to suggest that if consumers reduce their gasoline demand, this 
would reduce income and consequently spending in other sectors of the economy 
leading to more deep GDP decrease.  
Therefore, the strategy of Saudi Arabia on its production rates is uncertain, as 
decision making on that is being affecting by several factors. This adds further external 
-to OPEC- factors in the decision making of Saudi Arabia’s production strategy. 
Therefore, the Saudi Arabia’s strategy is a more complex task, which is tackled in this 
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paper by a holistic econometric analysis, examining the Saudi Arabia’s crude oil 
production, but as well world crude oil dynamics, as depicted in the evolution of the 
crude oil prices and the world crude oil demand. Finally this research does not focus on 
issues such as the existence of the Dutch disease or oil dependency of the kingdom as 
Perifanis and Dagoumas (2017) study for the Russian economy.  
Methodology and data 
3.1 Data 
Saudi Arabia’s strategy depends on world crude oil demand and crude oil price 
evolution. In order to capture the Saudi Arabia’s strategy, we provide a holistic 
econometric framework, by developing three econometric models: one for Saudi 
Arabia’s crude oil production-supply, one for crude oil prices and one for world crude 
oil demand, using data from the International Energy Agency, and World Bank, over 
the period 1971-2015.  
Our variables from IEA are the World Oil Demand in KB/D, OECD crude stocks 
in Kilotons and Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production in Kilotons. Variables from World 
Bank are the average real 2010 US dollars crude oil price and 2010 US dollars World 
GDP per capita. All the variables were examined in natural logarithms in order to obtain 
the respective elasticities. In order to examine the Saudi Arabia’s power over crude oil 
price, we estimated the production shares of Saudi Arabia and the rest of producers. We 
proceeded by estimating Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production share, by dividing Saudi 
Arabia’s crude oil production with the global crude oil production. The remaining crude 
oil production share was that of the rest of producers.  
To proceed with our estimations, we test our dependent and independent variables 
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for stationarity. All of our time series are non-stationary at levels. The absence of 
stationarity at levels indicates the existence of a unit root. The tests we use are the 
Augmented Dickey – Fuller and KPSS test with trend and intercept for both of them. 
The tests are conducted at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Since the variables are non-
stationary at levels I(0), then we proceed with their first differences. All the first 
differences of our variables are stationary. Since all of our data are non-stationary at 
levels but stationary at their first differences we test whether they are cointegrated i.e. 
if a long run relation exists between them.  The results of stationarity tests are presented 
in Table 1.  
Our test for cointegration is the Johansen Cointegration test. This examination is in 
order to avoid a spurious model which will result in low quality coefficients. In order 
to reach an assumption, we use the Trace and Maximum Eigenvalues Statistics and their 
respective probability. The tests are conducted at 5% and for the follow assumptions: 
No intercept and no deterministic trend. 
Intercept and no deterministic trend 
Intercept no linear deterministic trend 
Intercept and linear deterministic trend  
Intercept and quadratic deterministic trend. 
In order to proceed with the cointegration test we use the Akaike and Schwarz 
criteria for the lag length. Since we have the suggested lags, the criteria suggested one 
lag for all models, we use the Johansen Cointegration test with Trace and maximum 
Eigen Values. The results show that cointegration exists for all our models i.e. a long 
run relation between our variables. The world oil demand model and the crude price 
model assume linear deterministic trend and Saudi Arabia’s production model is 
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assumed with no deterministic trend. A summary of all the cointegration tests 
conducted and their results is presented in Tables 2 to 4. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Our aim was to examine the crude oil market forces and especially Saudi Arabia’s 
role. In our effort, we tried to examine the SA crude oil production, the crude oil price 
and the world crude oil demand, both in long-run and short-run. We used the two step 
Engle and Granger (1987) method to obtain long-run and short-run elasticities, as the 
variables are in natural logarithms and the respective coefficients are their elasticities. 
Under this method, we used as time series the residuals of the long-run models (ut) 
lagged by a single period in our second short-run models. This is the ECT-1 of our 
models and it is with a period lag in the short-run models. The variables of the short-
run models are the first differences of the variables of the long-run models.  
In order to have models that could explain all the above, we tested our models with 
several tests. Our main aim was to have models with homoscedasticity, no serial 
correlation and normally distributed residuals. The tests used were the Arch, White, 
LM and Jarque-Bera. One of our aim was also to have models which could explain the 
oil market efficiently enough i.e. with high R2 and adjusted R2. 
High R2 and adjusted R2 may also imply multicollinearity. In three out of six 
models, we have high R2. We tried several methods to avoid multicollinearity but this 
damaged the explanatory capability of our models i.e. we had heteroscedasticity or 
serial correlation or abnormally distributed residuals or a combination among them. 
The techniques used to avoid multicollinearity were the use of more lags, standardised 
variables or omitting some of the variables from the models. 
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This led us to examine Ridge regressions and their corresponding V.I.F. A V.I.F 
near 1 presents absence of multicollinearity and hence no correlation between the nth 
predictor with the rest of them. A V.I.F over 4 requests further investigation while a 
one over 10 presents evidence of strong multicollinearity. In the crude oil price model, 
we have the two production shares, the Saudi and that of the Rest of the producers’. 
Easily understood that if the Saudis hold a x-market share, then the rest of the producers 
hold a (1-x) share. As a result, this implies a high multicollinearity, but our effort was 
to explain the magnitude of Saudi Arabia’s power over price in comparison with the 
rest of the world. For the rest V.I.F present evidence of no multicollinearity. 
Further, to avoid serial correlation and have models with explanatory ability, we 
used variables with lags (both of the dependent and independent variables) and ARMA 
method with AR(1) and MA(1). In addition, we used Generalised Least Squares (GLS) 
with the Newton-Raphson method and Conditional Least Squares with Gauss-Newton 
method.  
 
 
3.2.1 Saudi Arabia ‘s crude oil production in long and short-run 
Our first model is about Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production, as a reaction to market 
developments. We assume that Saudi Arabia is responding to the market signals and 
adjusts its supply. These signals and market implications are world oil demand, OECD 
crude stocks, and Saudi Arabia’s market share in world crude production. We consider 
that Saudi Arabia will try to satisfy the higher demand by producing more or will try to 
defend its world market/production share. Profit maximization is a trade-off between 
higher prices (lower production) and higher market share (low prices). One producer 
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can augment its revenues by either taking advantages of higher prices or even by 
boosting production in a low-price environment to capture additional share. 
The equation for the Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production examined in the long-run 
is expressed by the following formula: 
 
𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃 = 𝑐 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑊𝑂𝐷 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑆 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑂𝑃 + 𝑢𝑡                        (1) 
 
where SCOP is the Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production, WOD is the world crude 
oil demand, OECDS is the OECD crude stocks and SSWOP is the Saudi Arabia’s crude 
oil production share. And ut is the disturbance term. Ut is later used for the short-run as 
ECT-1. ECT-1 is used with a one period lag in the short-run models.  The short-run 
model is: 
 
𝛥(𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃) = 𝑐 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝛥(𝑊𝑂𝐷) + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝛥(𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑆) + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝛥(𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑂𝑃) + 𝐸𝐶𝑇−1      (2) 
 
3.2.2 Crude oil price in long and short-run 
Our second model concerns the crude oil price. We aim to estimate how crude oil 
prices behave in relation to other market factors, considering the role of Saudi Arabia. 
Again, we use as an independent variable the OECD crude oil stocks. These changes 
are considered as of crucial importance by broadcasters, and it is yet to be proven by 
empirical research. We include two factors which are the production shares of Saudi 
Arabia and of the Rest of the World. If Saudi Arabia loses a portion of its share, the rest 
of the producers earns it. However, it remains a question whether the same percentage 
of crude oil production share by different producer has different weight on crude oil 
price or not.  
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The equation for the crude oil price examined the long-run is expressed by the following 
formula: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑐 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑆 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑅𝑊𝑆𝐶𝑃 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑂𝑃 + 𝑢𝑡                                (3) 
 
where CAR is the annual average of the crude oil price in 2010 US dollars, OECDS 
is the OECD crude oil stocks, RWSCP is the Rest of World crude oil production share 
and SSWOP is the Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production share. The short-run model is: 
𝛥(𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝑐 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝛥(𝑂𝐶𝑆𝐶) + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝛥(𝑅𝑊𝑆𝐶𝑃) + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝛥(𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑂𝑃) + 𝐸𝐶𝑇−1  (4) 
 
3.2.3 World crude oil demand in long and short-run 
The last model is structured under the assumption that world crude oil demand 
follows the general world economic growth, considering the world GDP per capita by 
World Bank as independent variable. The second independent variable is the crude oil 
price by the World Bank. The last independent variable is OECD crude oil stocks, as 
there is a lot of debate whether the latter drives crude oil demand, price, production or 
all of them collectively.  
This model does not include any variable directly linked with Saudi Arabia, which 
is the focus of the paper. Different variables, such as SAOD variable, representing 
Saudi Arabia’s crude oil demand, have been omitted from the model, as they proved to 
have neglecting impact on world oil demand. However, the model is kept to be part of 
this holistic econometric analysis, as it provides useful insights on the dynamics of 
world crude oil market. 
The equation for the world crude oil demand examined in the long-run is expressed 
by the following formula: 
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𝑊𝑂𝐷 = 𝑐 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑊𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑆 + 𝑢𝑡                              
(5) 
 
where all the variables as described above are in natural logarithms. The short-run 
model is: 
 
𝛥(𝑊𝑂𝐷) = 𝑐 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝛥(𝑊𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶) + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝛥(𝐶𝐴𝑅) + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝛥(𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑆) + 𝐸𝐶𝑇−1                                
(6) 
 
Where WOD is the world oil demand, WGDPPC is the World GDP per capita, CAR 
is the annual average of the crude oil price in 2010 US dollars, and OECDS is the OECD 
crude oil stocks.  
 
Empirical results 
4.1. Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production  
4.1.1 Long run 
We examine the model with ARMA and running with Newton- Raphson method as 
there was serial correlation in our initial models. Our regression has world oil demand, 
and Saudi share significant at all levels. OECD stocks are significant at 10% levels. The 
results of the model are shown in Table 5. 
World oil demand influences positively the crude production of Saudi Arabia. This 
is in compliance with theory, as Saudi Arabia tries to cover the extra demand with its 
production, increasing its revenues. The elasticity of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil 
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production to world crude oil demand is less than one (0.77), meaning that Saudi Arabia 
will not respond drastically, as this would decrease price. Saudi Arabia produces more, 
but not to fully cover the increased demand as this would lead to stable prices and 
reserve exhaustion. It also implies that Saudi administration attempts to catch most of 
the demand increase, but not to disrupt relations with the rest of the producers (evidence 
of production sharing). The elasticity is 0.77 positive, meaning that Saudi Arabia will 
increase its production 0.77% if world demand increases by 1%. The OECD crude oil 
stocks are not significant for 1% and 5%, and are positive with a low value 0.164, 
something that cannot be easily explained. Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production share 
has a positive relation with its crude oil production. The coefficient which is also the 
elasticity of SA’s crude oil production to its production share is over but close to one 
(1.071), which makes it elastic. This presents the Saudis’ intention and readiness to 
increase their production share, but it requires an asymmetrical increase. This intention 
is not monolithic as the elasticity is over but close to unity, meaning that they will not 
start to produce just to augment their share without considering other conditions. This 
is compliance with the trade-off theory (low production-high price to high production-
low price) (Table 5). 
 
4.1.2 Short run 
The short-run regression confirms some of our assumptions, as the elasticity 
towards global demand is again positive but this time elastic (over the unity 1.036). 
This result might imply that SA is more ready to capture temporary demand shocks by 
producing more. This will increase its revenues, and confirms its ability of maintaining 
spare production capacity. The policy of the spare capacity is validated. Moreover, the 
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over the unity elasticity implies its ability to smooth price fluctuations, which could 
pose threats to long term demand. The short-run elasticity is greater than the long-run, 
which is an interesting result, as it confirms Saudi ability in the oil market as price 
smoother. OECD stocks are significant and negative implying that Saudi Arabia is 
taking stocks and oil glut under consideration and adjusts its production so as not to 
oversupply. The rest of the coefficients are again significant but those of the ARMA. 
The production share coefficient is lower and (1.06) implying that SA is not trying to 
increase its production share fast, even if it is easier to achieve it in the short-run. This 
probably indicates that Saudi Arabia’s policy has not changed through time and it 
always had a production level that would satisfy its aims, without creating any 
disruptions with its colleagues. Both short and long run elasticities remain over but 
close to one, which means that Saudi Arabia is eager to defend its market share. The 
ECT-1 coefficient is the speed that short-run regression has towards the long-run one, 
implying that the 45% of the change will happen in a year’s period (Table 5). Both long 
run and short run models comply give with our research demands and provide good 
estimates as they satisfy all of our tests (White, Arch, LM and J. Bera). 
 
4.2 Crude oil price 
4.2.1 Long run 
We also examine what influences price. Our dependent variable is Price, and our 
independent variables are the OECD crude stocks, the Saudi and the rest of the World’s 
oil production shares. We used Generalised Least Squares and specifically the Gauss-
Newton method. The results of the model are shown in Table 6. 
All coefficients are significant for the 5% level of significance we use. The rest of 
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the world production share is significant, elastic and negative (-25.70), in compliance 
with theory as supply quantities cannot be stable and an increase in the share means 
more volume to the market. The result indicates that when the rest of the producers 
claim an increase in their production share, then prices react more abruptly. It can be 
explained by the concept, that the market price is more sensitive and more receptive to 
news by the rest of the producers, than from only one country. Saudi Arabia’s share 
coefficient is again negative (-3.18) but much lower as an absolute value meaning that 
the oil kingdom has much less effect on oil price alone than the rest of producers. 
Another implication by the vast difference between coefficients is the aversion of SA 
for unilateral actions. The kingdom knows that its share decline or increase will have 
much less influence on the price formation, than what would be if most of the producers 
agreed multilaterally (Table 6).  
OECD stocks have a negative coefficient (-4.44) implying that they deflate prices, 
a result in compliance to the late market developments. Their coefficient is higher in 
absolute value than that of Saudi Arabia, implying that the market is more responsive 
to the oil glut than to production quotas i.e. stocks more effective on oil price. This kind 
of results imply the limited role that Saudi Arabia can play in comparison to other 
market fundamentals. 
Additionally, all elasticities are much higher than unity implying increased 
volatility of the price. Crude prices respond very abruptly to the news whether these 
have to do with production quotas or stocks. 
 The AR is significant but not the MA coefficient. 
 
18 
 
4.2.2 Short run 
In the short run regression, we have similar results (Table 6). The production shares 
are significant, but the rest of the producers’ coefficient is much higher in absolute 
value (-21.21) compared to that of Saudi Arabia’s (-2.83). The production elasticities 
have lower absolute values implying that production fluctuation can have less effect on 
oil price in short periods. One assumption might be that production does not reach soon 
enough markets or that there are technological restrictions which affect production 
capacity. Nevertheless, they are again high implying high volatility and lead to the same 
results of the long-term model. OECD is only significant at the 10% and with a higher 
absolute value than the long-run. This result might imply that crude stocks play a more 
important role for the short-run movement of the price than in the long-run. Oil glut 
might be the main driver for the every-day price fluctuation, something close to the 
latest developments. Again, our tests for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are 
satisfied. 
4.3 World crude oil demand 
4.3.1 Long run 
As it was already mentioned, we regressed world crude oil demand against World 
GDP per capita, crude oil price, and OECD crude oil stocks. We used ARMA 
conditional Least Squares with the Gauss-Newton method. The model is not spurious 
as R2 is lower than Durbin-Watson stat. The results of the model are shown in Table 7.  
The coefficient for OECD crude oil stocks is low and statistically significant. It is 
positive implying that stocks’ piling increases oil demand which is a logical 
assumption. World GDP growth requires oil, and this drives world oil demand up. The 
long run elasticity is over unity (1.07) presenting that a 1% GDP growth increases oil 
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demand by 1.07%. When the opposite stands, and world economy falls in recession, oil 
demand declines. We have an elastic but very close to 1 elasticity of GDP, meaning 
that our economies are energy sensitive. This is in compliance with Kumhof and Muir 
(2012) who find that income elasticity of oil demand is close to 1. When the model 
estimates the coefficient of the crude price, we have a significant negative coefficient. 
This supports the theory as the relation should be negative. When prices increase, 
demand declines. The price elasticity is -0.01 implying that a 1% price increase would 
lead to a 0.01% decrease of oil demand. The elasticity is less than unity implying an 
inelastic relation i.e. world responds less sensitively in price fluctuations. The overall 
assumption is that world economy depends on oil, but does not responds sensitively 
enough to price fluctuations, which is an other implication of low substitution. The 
insensitive response to price might verify the research by Hamilton (2005, 2003,1983) 
and Gault (2011), who suggest a negative relation between prices and output. All the 
tests for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and normally distributed residuals are 
satisfied. 
 
4.3.2 Short run 
When the model is estimated for the short-run, the results are interesting (Table 7). 
OECD crude oil stocks are significant only at 10%. R2 and adjusted R2 are high 69%. 
The coefficient-elasticity of GDP slightly lower (1.01) than that in the long-run and 
remains over one. We have a more inelastic relation, presenting that oil demand is less 
sensitive to GDP in short-periods. This is in accordance with the ‘second law of 
demand’ or the LeChatelier principle which requires demand curves to be more elastic 
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in long-run than what they are in the short-run.1 
The main result, both in short and long run is that a GDP increase does add 
positively and almost symmetrically to global oil demand. The crude oil price elasticity 
is again negative less than 1 in absolute value (-0.010), and lower than that of long term. 
The absolute value of the short-run compared to the long-run exposes that economy 
does not have a better response to a price increase, but lower demand (dependence on 
oil-low substitution). The ECT-1 is statistically significant implying a well explanatory 
ability. The ECT-1 coefficient is the speed that short-run regression has towards to the 
long-run one, implying that the 40.67% of the change will happen in a year’s period. 
All the tests are satisfactory which testify the robustness of the model. 
 
Conclusions 
The evolution of high crude oil prices for over a decade have increased sharply the 
sovereign reserves of Saudi Arabia and its profitability. Saudi Arabia has a strong 
interest to keep crude oil prices at high levels, even if this requires to decrease its own 
production. However, the participating countries in the OPEC are deviating from their 
commitments, concerning their productions rates, due to internal problems of 
 
 
1 Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., (1996), The LeChatellier Principle, The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 or 
http://web.stanford.edu/~milgrom/publishedarticles/The%20LeChatelier%
20Principle.pdf 
 
 21 
 
production or aiming at supporting their balance sheets. Moreover, external -to OPEC- 
factors, such as the evolution of shale oil and gas in the USA, strongly affect the market 
share of all OPEC countries, challenging their profitability. Factors as foreign relations 
and security issues affect this behaviour. It is not a secret that oil is something more 
than a commodity for Saudi Arabia.  
This paper aims at examining the Saudi Arabia’s crude oil strategy, especially 
concerning the adjustment of its crude oil production related to crude oil price and 
world crude oil demand evolution. It provides a holistic econometric analysis, by 
developing three econometric models, one for Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production, one 
for crude oil prices and one for world crude oil demand. It provides evidence on Saudi 
Arabia’s crude oil strategy, as related to critical factors, such as crude oil stocks, price, 
other producers’ production, world demand and macro-economic factors towards this 
target.  
The global economy is the main factor driving world crude oil demand. Economic 
growth increases crude oil demand levels, and requires more crude oil production to 
meet demand. When the alternative exists, i.e. recession, world crude oil demand 
decreases. 
The long-run results from the Saudi crude oil production model, provide evidence 
that Saudi Arabia tries to catch the increased demand by increasing its production. 
When world crude oil demand increases then, Saudi Arabia tries to exploit higher prices 
with larger volumes, leaving part of the increased demand to the rest of the producers 
(production sharing). However, Saudi Arabia does not intent to fully cover all the 
demand increase and does not over-react, as such strategy would bring crude oil prices 
down. On the contrary, in the short-run, Saudi Arabia tries to more than fully cover 
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temporary demand shocks, in order to smooth prices and not pose a threat to long-term 
demand. The spare capacity ability of the kingdom is confirmed, as it operates as a price 
smoother for temporary price shocks. The result of an elastic short-run production 
elasticity, when the long-run is inelastic is interesting and highlights the special case of 
our study. In addition, Saudi Arabia reactions present evidence for the trade-off theory 
as the kingdom produces more crude oil to defend its production share. This explains 
why Saudi Arabia continued to produce in a decreasing price environment. Therefore, 
the research provides insights on the kingdom’s decision drivers under other -to OPEC- 
producers’ decisions. Finally, crude oil prices are more sensitive to others’ production 
than that of Saudi Arabia. This makes Saudi Arabia pursue more multilateral decisions, 
as a different approach would decrease its production share in a low-price environment. 
This conclusion is in accordance with the conclusions of the late OPEC Meeting, which 
are stated as “to conduct a serious and constructive dialogue with non-member 
producing countries, with the objective to stabilize the oil market and avoid the adverse 
impacts in the short- and medium-term.” Saudi Arabia realizes that its capability over 
global crude oil prices is limited, especially as new producers, as the USA, enter the 
market. 
Low substitution of oil, as an energy source, is verified by the low price elasticities 
of both long and short run regressions. Either way (long and short run), demand has a 
very low price elasticity presenting a very insensitive relation verifying our 
dependence. This kind of dependence may verify the results of Hamilton (2005, 
2003,1983) and Gault (2011) who suggest the negative influence of oil prices increases 
to the economy. 
Finally, the paper argues that Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production decisions are not 
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taken in strictly economical silos but rather are the by-products of more extended aims. 
The price-share dilemma is sometimes neglected when broader geopolitical targets or 
long-term market share issues are at stake. Therefore, Saudi Arabia adjusts its 
production strategy away from the optimal production level, towards meeting wider 
policy issues. 
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Acronyms 
OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
ECT: Error Correction Term 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GNP: Gross National Product 
IEA: International Energy Agency 
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ADF test: Augmented Dickey – Fuller test 
KPSS test: Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin test 
ARMA: AutoRegressive Moving Average 
AR: AutoRegressive 
MA: Moving Average 
V.I.F.: Variance Inflation Factor 
GLS: Generalised Least Squares 
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Nomenclature: 
SCOP: Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production. 
WOD: World crude oil demand. 
OCSC: OECD crude stock changes. 
SSWOP: Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production share. 
CAR: Annual average of the crude oil price in 2010 USD. 
RWSCP: Rest of World crude oil production share. 
WGDPPC: World GDP per capita in 2010 USD 
SA: Saudi Arabia 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Test for unit roots 1971-2015 
 
Level ADF KPSS First 
difference 
ADF KPSS 
WD -3.052 0.432a Δ(WD) 5.730a 0.169 
WGDPPC -2.592 0.427a Δ(WGDPPC) -5.334a 0.063 
CAR -2.368 1.413a Δ(CAR) -6.418a 0.108 
OECDS -1.688 8.155a Δ(OCS) -5.764a 0.079 
RWSCP -2.427 1.332a Δ(RWSCP) -5.723a 0.072 
SSWOP -2.334 0.241a Δ(SSWOP) -3.899a 0.069 
SCOP -2.293 0.338a Δ(SCOP) -3.994a 0.097 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis of the ADF test is that the variable has a unit root and the null hypothesis 
for the KPSS test is that the variable is stationary. The first difference of the series is indicated by Δ.  
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at all levels (1%, 5% and 10%). 
b Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% and 10%. 
c Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 10%. 
 
 
Table 2 
Johansen’s maximum likelihood method test for cointegration relationship 
SA production model 
Null Hypothesis 
Ho 
Alternative 
Hypothesis, H1 
Eigen Value 0.05 critical value 
Maximum 
eigenvalues 
   
r=0 r=1 65.033 54.079 
r≤1 r=2 31.149 35.192 
Trace statistics    
r=0 r≥1 33.893 28.588  
r≤1 r≥2 19.415 22.299 
Trace indicates 1 CE at 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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Table 3 
Johansen’s maximum likelihood method test for cointegration relationship 
Crude Price Model 
Null Hypothesis 
Ho 
Alternative 
Hypothesis, H1 
Eigen Value 0.05 critical value 
Maximum 
eigenvalues 
   
r=0 r=1 30.055 27.584 
r≤1 r=2 12.408 21.131 
Trace statistics    
r=0 r≥1 57.068 47.856  
r≤1 r≥2 27.013 29.797 
Trace indicates 1 CE at 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
Table 4 
Johansen’s maximum likelihood method test for cointegration relationship 
Demand 
Null Hypothesis 
Ho 
Alternative 
Hypothesis, H1 
Eigen Value 0.05 critical value 
Maximum 
eigenvalues 
   
r=0 r=1 37.638 27.584 
r≤1 r=2 11.178 21.131 
Trace statistics    
r=0 r≥1 55.051 47.856  
r≤1 r≥2 17.424 29.797 
Trace indicates 1 CE at 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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Table 5 
SA crude oil production model – Long Run and Short run 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error 
C 4.228b 1.736   
WOD 0.777a 0.049   
OECDS 0.164c 0.089   
SSWOP 1.071a 0.016   
AR(1) 0.125c 0.327   
MA(1) 0.388 0.304   
C   -0.009a 0.003 
Δ(WOD)   1.036a 0.108 
Δ(OECDS)   -0.572a 0.200 
Δ(SSWOP)  . 1.062a 0.016 
ECT-1   -0.453a 0.158 
AR(1)   1.000 2.770 
MA(1)   -0.999 0.054 
 
a Indicates significance at all levels (1%, 5% and 10%). 
b Indicates significance at 5% and 10%. 
c Indicates significance at 10%. 
 
Table 6 
Crude oil price model –  Long Run and Short run 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error 
C 52.643c 26.191   
RWSCP -25.704a 8.979   
SSWOP -3.182a 1.114   
OECDS -4.443b 1.938   
AR(1) 0.772a 0.124   
MA(1) 0.308 0.187   
C   -0.009 0.079 
Δ(RWSCP)   -21.214a 4.467 
Δ(SSWOP)   -2.835a 0.397 
Δ(OECDS)   -7.962c 4.189 
ECT-1   -0.546a 0.176 
AR(1)   -0.143 0.225 
MA(1)   1.000 2931.893 
 
a Indicates significance at all levels (1%, 5% and 10%). 
b Indicates significance at 5% and 10%. 
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c Indicates significance at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
World crude oil demand model -Long Run and Short run 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error 
C -4.127 2.620   
WGDPPC 1.074a 0.075   
CAR -0.014b 0.005   
OECDS 0.433a 0.153   
AR 0.665a 0.103   
MA 0.597a 0.139   
C   0.001 0.003 
Δ(WGDPPC)   1.011a 0.135 
Δ(CAR)   -0.010b 0.004 
Δ(OECDS)   0.332c 0.176 
ECT-1   -0.406a 0.092 
AR   -0.030 0.181 
MA   0.953a 0.057 
 
a Indicates significance at all levels (1%, 5% and 10%). 
b Indicates significance at 5% and 10%. 
c Indicates significance at 10%. 
 
